{"ontology":"https://layer.re/machine/schema.json","epistemic_model":"evidence-backed-temporal-layer-graph","canonical":true,"type":"layer_history","layer":{"id":"layer-geopolitics","slug":"geopolitics","name":"Geopolitics","description":"Cross-border policy, competition and coordination.","machine_description":"Cross-border policy, competition and coordination.","active":1},"snapshots":[{"id":"state-geopolitics-2022q1","layer_id":"layer-geopolitics","as_of":"2022-03-31 23:59:59.000","summary":"Technology supply chains were already explicit geopolitical objects: Europe framed semiconductor dependence as a sovereignty/resilience problem and U.S.-led export controls restricted Russia's technology access.","dependencies":["layer-chips","layer-manufacturing","layer-governance","layer-software"],"constraints":["cross-border dependencies","export-control exposure","concentrated semiconductor supply"],"emerging_capabilities":["coordinated technology restrictions","regional semiconductor industrial strategy"],"underdeveloped_components":["stable cross-border technology regimes"],"uncertainties":["Russia controls were not AI-specific; later China-focused AI-chip controls must not be projected backward"],"confidence":0.94,"previous_snapshot_id":null,"mapping_mode":"retrospective","reconstructed_at":"2026-10-01T17:34:32.000Z","created_at":"2026-10-01T18:05:36.397Z","updated_at":"2026-10-01T18:05:36.397Z"},{"id":"state-geopolitics-2022q2","layer_id":"layer-geopolitics","as_of":"2022-06-30 23:59:59.000","summary":"Technology geopolitics became more coordinated across allied institutions, with semiconductors, export controls, standards and trustworthy AI increasingly discussed inside one policy machinery.","dependencies":["layer-governance","layer-chips","layer-manufacturing","layer-ai"],"constraints":["war-driven export restrictions","supply-chain concentration","standards competition"],"emerging_capabilities":["cross-border semiconductor early-warning cooperation","coordinated technology-control policy"],"underdeveloped_components":["stable global technology regimes"],"uncertainties":["coordination commitments did not guarantee later policy convergence"],"confidence":0.94,"previous_snapshot_id":"state-geopolitics-2022q1","mapping_mode":"retrospective","reconstructed_at":"2026-10-01T18:14:00.000Z","created_at":"2026-10-01T19:22:17.765Z","updated_at":"2026-10-01T19:22:17.765Z"},{"id":"state-geopolitics-2022q3","layer_id":"layer-geopolitics","as_of":"2022-09-30 23:59:59.000","summary":"Technology geopolitics moved from broad semiconductor resilience and export-control coordination toward direct restrictions on access to specific advanced AI accelerators.","dependencies":["layer-governance","layer-chips","layer-manufacturing","layer-compute"],"constraints":["technology-access fragmentation","supply-chain concentration","policy uncertainty"],"emerging_capabilities":["accelerator-specific export licensing","domestic semiconductor capacity programs"],"underdeveloped_components":["stable global technology-access regime"],"uncertainties":["the August NVIDIA requirement was narrower than the October 7 BIS controls and must not be treated as the later regime"],"confidence":0.97,"previous_snapshot_id":"state-geopolitics-2022q2","mapping_mode":"retrospective","reconstructed_at":"2026-10-02T15:12:29.000Z","created_at":"2026-10-02T16:08:16.259Z","updated_at":"2026-10-02T16:08:16.259Z"},{"id":"state-geopolitics-2022q4","layer_id":"layer-geopolitics","as_of":"2022-12-31 23:59:59.000","summary":"By end-Q4, advanced computing, supercomputer capability and semiconductor manufacturing technology were explicitly coupled to geopolitical access restrictions in a formal U.S. regulatory regime.","dependencies":["layer-governance","layer-chips","layer-compute","layer-manufacturing"],"constraints":["technology fragmentation","licensing uncertainty","supply-chain concentration","cross-border manufacturing dependence"],"emerging_capabilities":["formal advanced-computing and semiconductor-manufacturing export-control architecture"],"underdeveloped_components":["stable cross-border advanced-compute access"],"uncertainties":["later revisions and enforcement outcomes must not be projected backward into 2022"],"confidence":0.99,"previous_snapshot_id":"state-geopolitics-2022q3","mapping_mode":"retrospective","reconstructed_at":"2026-10-03T14:26:11.000Z","created_at":"2026-10-03T14:45:10.929Z","updated_at":"2026-10-03T14:45:10.929Z"},{"id":"state-geopolitics-2023q1","layer_id":"layer-geopolitics","as_of":"2023-03-31 23:59:59.000","summary":"Technology geopolitics remained centered on advanced compute and semiconductor capability, with Q1 adding U.S. manufacturing-funding implementation and Dutch policy commitment toward additional advanced equipment controls.","dependencies":["layer-governance","layer-chips","layer-compute","layer-manufacturing"],"constraints":["technology-access fragmentation","policy implementation lag","supply-chain concentration","licensing uncertainty"],"emerging_capabilities":["broader allied semiconductor-control direction","operational industrial-policy funding process"],"underdeveloped_components":["stable cross-border advanced-technology access"],"uncertainties":["Dutch Q1 evidence is policy direction, not later effective licensing scope."],"confidence":0.95,"previous_snapshot_id":"state-geopolitics-2022q4","mapping_mode":"retrospective","reconstructed_at":"2026-10-05T15:23:51.000Z","created_at":"2026-10-05T18:17:53.804Z","updated_at":"2026-10-05T18:17:53.804Z"},{"id":"state-geopolitics-2023q2","layer_id":"layer-geopolitics","as_of":"2023-06-30 23:59:59.000","summary":"Technology geopolitics broadened toward EU semiconductor resilience policy and multilateral AI-governance coordination alongside continuing technology controls.","dependencies":["layer-governance","layer-manufacturing","layer-chips","layer-ai"],"constraints":["policy fragmentation","supply concentration","implementation lag"],"emerging_capabilities":["EU chip resilience policy","G7 AI coordination"],"underdeveloped_components":["stable international AI rules","diversified advanced-node supply"],"uncertainties":["coordination does not guarantee harmonized implementation"],"confidence":0.94,"previous_snapshot_id":"state-geopolitics-2023q1","mapping_mode":"retrospective","reconstructed_at":"2026-10-07T12:55:58.000Z","created_at":"2026-10-07T14:04:48.613Z","updated_at":"2026-10-07T14:04:48.613Z"},{"id":"state-geopolitics-2023q3","layer_id":"layer-geopolitics","as_of":"2023-09-30 23:59:59.000","summary":"Technology geopolitics became more operational in Q3 as European semiconductor sovereignty policy entered force and Dutch advanced-equipment export licensing became effective, while frontier-AI safety also became a topic of state-industry coordination.","dependencies":["layer-governance","layer-chips","layer-compute","layer-manufacturing","layer-ai"],"constraints":["technology fragmentation","export licensing","supply-chain concentration","nonbinding AI coordination"],"emerging_capabilities":["operative Dutch equipment controls","EU Chips Act in force","frontier-AI state-industry safety commitments"],"underdeveloped_components":["stable cross-border technology access","binding international frontier-AI governance"],"uncertainties":["Q3 does not include the October U.S. AI Executive Order or November Bletchley Declaration"],"confidence":0.97,"previous_snapshot_id":"state-geopolitics-2023q2","mapping_mode":"retrospective","reconstructed_at":"2026-10-07T16:04:51.000Z","created_at":"2026-10-07T16:56:16.871Z","updated_at":"2026-10-07T16:56:16.871Z"},{"id":"state-geopolitics-2023q4","layer_id":"layer-geopolitics","as_of":"2023-12-31 23:59:59.000","summary":"Technology geopolitics combined tighter U.S. chip/compute controls with explicit international frontier-AI coordination and EU agreement on model-specific AI regulation.","dependencies":["layer-governance","layer-chips","layer-compute","layer-manufacturing","layer-ai"],"constraints":["technology fragmentation","export controls","nonbinding coordination"],"emerging_capabilities":["Bletchley coordination","expanded U.S. chip controls","EU GPAI agreement"],"underdeveloped_components":["binding global frontier-AI regime","stable cross-border advanced-compute access"],"uncertainties":["International AI coordination remained plural and nonbinding"],"confidence":0.98,"previous_snapshot_id":"state-geopolitics-2023q3","mapping_mode":"retrospective","reconstructed_at":"2026-10-08T15:50:00.000Z","created_at":"2026-10-08T17:00:00.135Z","updated_at":"2026-10-08T17:00:00.135Z"},{"id":"state-geopolitics-2024q1","layer_id":"layer-geopolitics","as_of":"2024-03-31 23:59:59.000","summary":"European AI governance and US semiconductor industrial policy moved toward implementation through institutional and legislative steps with different binding force.","dependencies":[],"constraints":["availability scope","reliability and implementation limits"],"emerging_capabilities":["Commission adopts decision establishing European AI Office","European Parliament adopts AI Act text at first reading","Intel receives preliminary CHIPS funding terms"],"underdeveloped_components":["generalization beyond the selected evidence"],"uncertainties":["The office's establishment does not make the forthcoming AI Act already applicable.","Parliament approval is not final enactment, entry into force or application of obligations.","Preliminary terms are not a final award, disbursement or completed manufacturing capacity."],"confidence":0.93,"previous_snapshot_id":"state-geopolitics-2023q4","mapping_mode":"retrospective","reconstructed_at":"2026-10-09T19:12:47.000Z","created_at":"2026-10-09T21:04:17.189Z","updated_at":"2026-10-09T21:04:17.189Z"},{"id":"state-geopolitics-2024q2","layer_id":"layer-geopolitics","as_of":"2024-06-30 23:59:59.000","summary":"Binding EU legislative adoption and voluntary multinational frontier commitments advanced through different governance mechanisms.","dependencies":[],"constraints":["availability scope","reliability and implementation limits"],"emerging_capabilities":["Sixteen companies agree Seoul frontier safety commitments","Council gives final AI Act approval"],"underdeveloped_components":["generalization beyond the selected evidence"],"uncertainties":["Commitments are not binding legislation or demonstrated implementation; later-added signatories are excluded.","Final approval is not entry into force or immediate application of every obligation."],"confidence":0.93,"previous_snapshot_id":"state-geopolitics-2024q1","mapping_mode":"retrospective","reconstructed_at":"2026-10-09T19:12:47.000Z","created_at":"2026-10-10T07:29:06.791Z","updated_at":"2026-10-10T07:29:06.791Z"},{"id":"state-geopolitics-2024q3","layer_id":"layer-geopolitics","as_of":"2024-09-30 23:59:59.000","summary":"AI governance and semiconductor supply policy advanced through EU regulation, US evaluation partnerships and proposed domestic packaging support.","dependencies":[],"constraints":["availability scope","reliability and implementation limits"],"emerging_capabilities":["EU AI Act enters into force","SK hynix signs preliminary US packaging funding terms","US AISI signs model-evaluation agreements"],"underdeveloped_components":["generalization beyond the selected evidence"],"uncertainties":["Entry into force is distinct from staged application; later amended implementation dates are excluded.","Proposed grants and loans do not establish finalized award or operating US HBM production.","Agreements are not mandatory universal certification; the page's June 2025 CAISI update is excluded."],"confidence":0.93,"previous_snapshot_id":"state-geopolitics-2024q2","mapping_mode":"retrospective","reconstructed_at":"2026-10-09T19:12:47.000Z","created_at":"2026-10-10T07:49:15.922Z","updated_at":"2026-10-10T07:49:15.922Z"},{"id":"state-geopolitics-2024q4","layer_id":"layer-geopolitics","as_of":"2024-12-31 23:59:59.000","summary":"Domestic semiconductor incentives and tightened China-directed production controls reinforced strategic supply-chain competition.","dependencies":[],"constraints":["availability scope","reliability and implementation limits"],"emerging_capabilities":["TSMC Arizona receives finalized CHIPS award","US expands semiconductor export-control package"],"underdeveloped_components":["generalization beyond the selected evidence"],"uncertainties":["Milestone-linked award is not full disbursement or completed fab capacity.","Announcement is not a single effective date for every provision; implementation details and savings clauses differ."],"confidence":0.93,"previous_snapshot_id":"state-geopolitics-2024q3","mapping_mode":"retrospective","reconstructed_at":"2026-10-09T19:12:47.000Z","created_at":"2026-10-10T08:02:14.509Z","updated_at":"2026-10-10T08:02:14.509Z"},{"id":"state-geopolitics-2025q1","layer_id":"layer-geopolitics","as_of":"2025-03-31 23:59:59.000","summary":"US leadership policy, planned manufacturing/infrastructure expansion and diffusion controls reinforced strategic AI competition.","dependencies":[],"constraints":["availability scope","reliability and implementation limits"],"emerging_capabilities":["AI diffusion rule becomes effective with deferred compliance","Stargate announces intended US infrastructure investment","US orders AI leadership policy review and action plan","TSMC announces additional US manufacturing investment plans"],"underdeveloped_components":["generalization beyond the selected evidence"],"uncertainties":["The rule is not yet fully compliant by Q1 cutoff; subsequent rescission is not imported.","Intended investment and initial deployment plans are not financed, completed or operating capacity.","Executive direction is not repeal of every AI law or an already completed action plan.","The announcement is not completed capacity or disbursed investment; the primary release is issued March 4."],"confidence":0.93,"previous_snapshot_id":"state-geopolitics-2024q4","mapping_mode":"retrospective","reconstructed_at":"2026-10-09T19:12:47.000Z","created_at":"2026-10-10T08:11:02.818Z","updated_at":"2026-10-10T08:11:02.818Z"},{"id":"state-geopolitics-2025q2","layer_id":"layer-geopolitics","as_of":"2025-06-30 23:59:59.000","summary":"This period adds specific geopolitics evidence through BIS announces diffusion-rule rescission and non-enforcement. Maturity remains specific to the cited products and programs; this synthesis does not infer sector-wide adoption.","dependencies":[],"constraints":["The announcement is not proof that the formal replacement regulation was already completed."],"emerging_capabilities":["BIS announces diffusion-rule rescission and non-enforcement"],"underdeveloped_components":["Independent measurement of deployment scope and outcomes"],"uncertainties":["The referenced historical predecessor belongs to the reviewed chronology; the live history must be checked before ingestion."],"confidence":0.9,"previous_snapshot_id":"state-geopolitics-2025q1","mapping_mode":"retrospective","reconstructed_at":"2026-10-10T06:24:42.000Z","created_at":"2026-10-10T08:25:19.363Z","updated_at":"2026-10-10T08:25:19.363Z"},{"id":"state-geopolitics-2025q3","layer_id":"layer-geopolitics","as_of":"2025-09-30 23:59:59.000","summary":"This period adds specific geopolitics evidence through US AI Action Plan is published. Maturity remains specific to the cited products and programs; this synthesis does not infer sector-wide adoption.","dependencies":[],"constraints":["Proposed actions do not establish completed implementation or altered law for every item."],"emerging_capabilities":["US AI Action Plan is published"],"underdeveloped_components":["Independent measurement of deployment scope and outcomes"],"uncertainties":["The referenced historical predecessor belongs to the reviewed chronology; the live history must be checked before ingestion."],"confidence":0.9,"previous_snapshot_id":"state-geopolitics-2025q2","mapping_mode":"retrospective","reconstructed_at":"2026-10-10T06:24:42.000Z","created_at":"2026-10-10T08:31:22.791Z","updated_at":"2026-10-10T08:31:22.791Z"},{"id":"state-geopolitics-20260930-initial","layer_id":"layer-geopolitics","as_of":"2026-09-30 12:45:00.000","summary":"AI infrastructure competition increasingly involves complete national and regional technology stacks, with China pushing domestic chips and software as alternatives to Nvidia-centered infrastructure.","dependencies":["layer-chips","layer-software","layer-manufacturing","layer-research"],"constraints":["export controls","supply chains","capital and manufacturing access"],"emerging_capabilities":["domestic accelerator ecosystems","open-source stack-building"],"underdeveloped_components":["global interoperability across competing ecosystems"],"uncertainties":["future export-control regimes and international adoption"],"confidence":0.91,"previous_snapshot_id":null,"mapping_mode":"contemporaneous","reconstructed_at":null,"created_at":"2026-09-30T12:54:32.493Z","updated_at":"2026-09-30T12:54:32.493Z"},{"id":"state-geopolitics-20260930-late","layer_id":"layer-geopolitics","as_of":"2026-09-30 21:20:00.000","summary":"AI competition is extending beyond chips and software into research access and academic collaboration, adding knowledge flows to the contested geopolitical technology stack.","dependencies":["layer-research","layer-chips","layer-software","national security institutions"],"constraints":["espionage concerns","research openness versus security"],"emerging_capabilities":["research-security controls around frontier domains"],"underdeveloped_components":["trusted cross-border collaboration mechanisms"],"uncertainties":["verification of state-linked research influence claims"],"confidence":0.88,"previous_snapshot_id":"state-geopolitics-20260930-initial","mapping_mode":"contemporaneous","reconstructed_at":null,"created_at":"2026-09-30T21:57:03.551Z","updated_at":"2026-09-30T21:57:03.551Z"},{"id":"state-geopolitics-20261002-eu-compute","layer_id":"layer-geopolitics","as_of":"2026-10-02 07:22:00.000","summary":"European compute sovereignty is advancing through ownership, manufacturing and system integration while remaining materially interdependent with non-European accelerator ecosystems.","dependencies":["layer-manufacturing","layer-compute","layer-chips"],"constraints":["external accelerator dependence","supply-chain concentration"],"emerging_capabilities":["greater domestic control of system assembly and production capacity"],"underdeveloped_components":["full-stack strategic autonomy"],"uncertainties":["how quickly European processor and accelerator alternatives mature"],"confidence":0.93,"previous_snapshot_id":null,"mapping_mode":"contemporaneous","reconstructed_at":null,"created_at":"2026-10-02T09:22:12.383Z","updated_at":"2026-10-02T09:22:12.383Z"},{"id":"state-geopolitics-20261004-ai-control","layer_id":"layer-geopolitics","as_of":"2026-10-04 20:12:00.000","summary":"AI competition and governance are increasingly shaped by institutional control over models, compute and policy coordination: the U.S. formalized a national AI coordination role under its intelligence chief, European open-weight capability expanded, and bilateral U.S.-China AI-risk communication entered discussion.","dependencies":["layer-governance","layer-models","layer-compute","layer-open-source"],"constraints":["cross-border trust","accelerator and compute dependence","uncertain bilateral implementation"],"emerging_capabilities":["sovereign/local model deployment options","formal national AI coordination","potential incident-notification channels"],"underdeveloped_components":["full-stack regional autonomy","durable bilateral AI-risk protocol"],"uncertainties":["whether open-weight releases translate into strategic autonomy","future scope of U.S. AI task-force authority"],"confidence":0.92,"previous_snapshot_id":null,"mapping_mode":"contemporaneous","reconstructed_at":null,"created_at":"2026-10-04T21:57:54.257Z","updated_at":"2026-10-04T21:57:54.257Z"}]}